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und internationaler Ebene zumindest bis 
1943 parallel zum Ersten Weltkrieg, bis 
das Patentwesen in Deutschland kriegsbe-
dingt zusammenbrach und endgültig erst 
1949 mit der Eröffnung des Deutschen 
Patentamtes in München seinen Betrieb 
wieder aufnahm.
Diese gut geschriebene, mit vielen span-
nenden Details ausgestattete Studie gibt 
einen profunden Einblick in die Bedeu-
tung des Patentwesens für das Funkti-
onieren einer hochgradig verflochtenen 
internationalen Wirtschaft. Dabei zeigt 
Mächtel die Stabilität einer internationa-
len Eigentumsordnung auf, die Ende des 
19. Jahrhunderts erstmals multilateral 
institutionalisiert wurde und sich in dem 
relativ kurzen Zeitraum von 1883 bis zum 
Ausbruch des Ersten Weltkriegs als ein so 
wichtiges wirtschaftspolitisches Instru-
ment bewährte, dass sie nach 1914 verbal-
politisch und gesetzgeberisch zwar ange-
griffen und eingeschränkt wurde, praktisch 
von den Kriegsgegnern aber weitestgehend 
eingehalten und nach Kriegsbeginn wieder 
in Kraft gesetzt wurde. Damit leistet die 
Studie einen wichtigen Beitrag zur Fra-
ge, inwieweit der Erste Weltkrieg als eine 
Zäsur in der Wirtschaftsgeschichte inter-
pretiert werden kann, die eine Phase der 
De-Globalisierung einleitet. Schade ist, 
dass Mächel diese Fragestellungen in sei-
ner Studie nicht berücksichtigt, da er aus-
schließlich rechtshistorische und rechts-
wissenschaftliche Forschungsdiskussionen 
aufgreift und es versäumt, seine Ergebnisse 
mit Diskussionen in anderen historischen 
Teilgebieten zu verknüpfen. Das sollte den 
interessierten Leser aber nicht davon ab-
halten, zu diesem Buch zu greifen.
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This book is the product of a British Acad-
emy symposium held in 2006, but it is rep-
resentative of a much larger body of recent 
work on British imperial thought from its 
origins in the sixteenth century to its nadir 
in the mid-twentieth century. In part, this 
scholarly effort is a response to demand for 
British history to be set in wider contexts 
– a demand that runs back to J. R. Seeley, 
and reiterated by many historians since, 
from Herbert Butterfield to his now more 
famous student, J. G. A. Pocock. In part 
too, as Duncan Kelly notes, the surge in 
interest in imperial thought is a response 
to events in contemporary international 
relations. The ‘desire to trace the geneal-
ogy of our current predicament’, as Kelly 
puts it (p. xiii), runs through all the essays 
in this book.
James Tully’s opening chapter, ‘Lineages of 
Contemporary Imperialism’, addresses the 
question most directly. Seven particular 
lineages are identified: informal, free trade, 
colonial and indirect, nineteenth century 
civilisational [sic], cooperative mandate, 
US, and contemporary imperialism. These 
are analysed in no particular chronologi-
cal order, emphasizing the areas of overlap 
between them, and leaving the impression 
that imperialism is not just common, but 
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ubiquitous in contemporary world poli-
tics. Reiterating this point from a differ-
ent perspective, Uday Singh Mehta’s essay 
on the making of the Indian constitution 
highlights the difficulties post-colonial 
elites faced when trying to construct a pol-
ity and reconstruct a society in the after-
math of empire. 
The remaining chapters consist of more 
conventional pieces of intellectual history. 
Richard Whatmore traces the development 
of Western European views of small states 
and their future prospects in an eighteenth 
century world of emerging commercial 
empires. His concern is the ‘origin of the 
perception of Britain as a defender of small 
states’ – a perception not just confined to 
British thinkers, but shared by some Swiss 
and Genevan practitioners, who saw in 
Britain a putative saviour. 
Phiroze Vasunia, for his part, examines 
changing readings of Virgil – the ‘poet of 
empire’ (p. 83) – in late eighteenth and 
nineteenth century Britain. He shows that 
Virgil was a touchstone for both critics and 
supporters of British imperialism, a point 
of contact between a Roman past and Brit-
ish future, his poem serving as confirma-
tion of providential roles for empire. Iain 
Hampsher-Monk and Robert Travers’ 
two chapters turn instead on matters In-
dian: the first explores Edmund Burke’s 
understanding of empire and the second 
the analysis of the East India Company’s 
economic management provided by James 
Steuart and Adam Smith, which Travers 
thinks helped structure their broader views 
of political economy.
The final three essays consider British anxi-
eties about aspects of their empire. Karen 
O’Brien looks at Tory views of the so-
cial consequences of emigration for both 
Britain and the colonies, while Douglas 
Lorimer deals with the various ideologies 
and languages of race that emerged in the 
late nineteenth- and early twentieth-centu-
ries. Tories, O’Brien demonstrates, viewed 
colonial settlement through a romantic 
lens, rather than an universalist one, lin-
gering on the recreation of rural idylls of 
upstanding and God-fearing yeomen. In 
his chapter, Lorimer argues that scientific 
racism was more a rationalization of exist-
ing and evolving cultural prejudices than 
an ideology generated de novo. 
The last essay, by Jeanne Morefield, ad-
dresses Harold Laski’s identification of 
the ‘habits’ of imperialism, those patterns 
of behaviour apparently encouraged by 
the administration of empire which Laski 
thought crypto-authoritarian. Morefield 
aims to liberate Laski from those that 
have argued that his thinking on empire is 
mostly derivative, especially of Lenin. In-
stead, she thinks it is better seen in terms 
of Laski’s analysis of the nature of sover-
eignty, with imperialism seen as a cor-
rupted extension of sovereign power rather 
than merely of capitalism.
This is a high quality collection by a group 
of accomplished scholars. This reader 
wished for a concluding chapter that 
teased out more fully the ‘genealogy’ of 
our ‘predicament’, since the arguments 
presented by the various authors seem to 
contain some intriguing contradictions. 
Hampsher-Monk’s essay is especially in-
teresting in this regard. He notes that the 
words ‘empire’ and ‘imperialism’ derive 
from the Roman conception of imperium, 
the rule of the highest magistrates who 
were answerable – at least in times of crisis 
– to no others. In ‘any entity larger than 
a city, and in the absence of the unified, 
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functionally integrated state of moder-
nity’, he observes, ‘imperium was almost 
always exercised over internally differenti-
ated political communities’ (p. 118). To 
a thinker steeped in Roman thought like 
Burke, therefore, ‘empire’ merely implied 
the rule of a monarch or ‘presiding repub-
lick’ over a collection of polities (p. 119). 
In itself, ‘empire’ was thus morally neutral 
– what mattered, at least to Burke, was the 
quality of rule, not the fact of it.
This is a very different view to Tully’s. Here, 
empire and imperialism are simply bad in 
whatever form they are found and the link 
between these concepts and sovereignty is 
broken. What Tully calls ‘alternate forms 
of political, legal, and economic associa-
tions based in self-reliance, fair trade, non-
violence, deep ecology, and cooperative 
networks’ are preferred (p. 29). 
Between Burke and Tully, in other words, 
there has been conceptual broadening and 
narrowing. For Tully, empires and imperial-
ism are anything powerful and wide-reach-
ing; sovereignty – or at least the self-deter-
mination of political communities, which 
Tully favours – has been emancipated from 
the idea of imperium. Historiographically, 
these processes have been unhelpful, allow-
ing for the separation of histories of states 
from histories of empires that occurred 
– despite Seeley’s best efforts – in the late 
nineteenth century and persisted into the 
late twentieth. Better, one might argue, 
to see states and empires as points on one 
continuum, as different forms of imperia. 
But to do this requires some change in the 
moral views of historians, not least a move-
ment away from Tully’s insistence that em-
pire is a form of political organization in 
a category of its own, uniquely worthy of 
our opprobrium.
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Im Gegensatz zu größeren, durch aka-
demische Qualifikationsverfahren moti-
vierten Schriften (zuletzt vor C. Seiler, den 
Grimm zitiert, etwa U. Schliesky, Souve-
ränität und Legitimität von Herrschafts-
gewalt, 2004, liegt mit dem hier anzuzei-
genden Band eine kleine Streitschrift zum 
Thema vor. Sie kompensiert ihre Kürze, 
die keine umfassende Gelehrsamkeit schon 
durch ihren Umfang ausbreitet, durch die 
Aura elitärer Kompetenz. Der Autor ist 
dazu nicht nur dank seiner mehrschich-
tigen Karriere, sondern auch aufgrund sei-
ner transatlantischen Existenz berufen. Sie 
stützt diese Aura durch die ausgewertete 
Literatur; so werden zahlreiche Arbeiten 
aus der angelsächsischen und der franko-
phonen Welt einbezogen, die ein biederer 
Habilitand in der deutschen Provinz sich 
nicht so leicht wird zugänglich machen 
können wie ein Gelehrter in New Haven 
oder Cambridge, Massachusetts, und am 
hiesigen Wissenschaftskolleg in Berlin. 
Daher erstaunt es auch nicht, wenn der 
deutsche Horizont eher zurücktritt, ob-
wohl die Rechtsprechung des Bundesver-
fassungsgerichts durchaus gespiegelt wird, 
das Lissabon-Urteil allerdings nicht mehr 
wirklich, dafür kam es am 30. Juni 2009 
zu spät. Aber es wird sicher Eingang fin-
